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I. INTRODUCTION
The objective theory of contracts provides that mutual assent to a
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contract is determined by reference to external acts and manifestations,
not by evidence of subjective, internal intention.1 Stated more simply,
contract formation depends on what is communicated, not on what is
merely thought.2  Thus, modem objective theory provides that
"objective manifestations of intent of [a] party should generally be
viewed from the vantage point of a reasonable person in the position of
the other party."3  The objective theory of contract formation is
overwhelmingly followed in common law jurisdictions.4 On one level,
objective theory is certainly a matter of evidentiary pragmatism. 5  On
another level, it vindicates many of the philosophical underpinnings of
contract law in a free society, such as the principle of fairness, the
protection against reliance, freedom of contract, and personal
autonomy.
6
Despite the clear dominance and importance of the objective theory of
contracts, certain doctrines in contract law pertaining to contract
formation 7 persist even though the doctrines are clearly contrary to
objective theory and its policy goals. Chief among these doctrines are
the following: (1) the "death of offeror" rule, which provides that a
revocable offer is terminated upon the offeror's death,8 (2) the "mailbox
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 309 (Dover Publ'ns, Inc. 1991) (1881)
("The law has nothing to do with the actual state of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must
go by externals, and judge parties by their conduct.").
2. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon
Fuller's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 129-30 (2000) (describing history of
development of objective theory).
3. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 2.2, at 27 (5th ed. 2003)
(citing Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring)).
4. Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 428 (2000).
5. Id. at 428-29. Professor Perillo states that the objective theory became permanently
dominant when most jurisdictions changed the rules of procedure to allow litigants to testify for
themselves. Id.
6. See PERILLO, supra note 3, § 1.4, at 6-13.
7. This Article is concerned solely with contract formation-that is, whether or not a contract
has ostensibly been formed in the first place by the appearance of mutual assent. It is not concerned
with various defenses to the enforceability of a contract which has otherwise been formed, such as
mistake, misrepresentation, and duress. These defenses appropriately rely on an examination into the
parties' subjective understandings. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151-76 (1981); see
also Perillo, supra note 4, at 428 ("Subjective approaches did ... transform the availability of relief for
mistake, duress, and other grounds of avoidance."); I SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 4:1, at 335 (4th ed. 2007) ("By contrast, courts exercising
equitable jurisdiction have not shown the same indifference to the undisclosed intention of the parties as
have courts of law; but insofar as the concern is with the rules of law governing the formation of
contracts, not with whether contracts so formed are or might be subject to reformation or rescission in
equity, that distinction is not important.").
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48. Actually, the rule as formulated by the
Restatement provides that death of either the offeror or the offeree terminates the offer. Id.
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rule," which provides that certain contracts are formed at the moment an
acceptance is dispatched,9 and (3) the finding of consumer assent to
objectionable but unread terms in standard form contracts.'I
Each of these doctrines is in some way inconsistent with the objective
theory of contracts, especially in their implication of individual
autonomy and reliance concerns. The death of offeror rule terminates an
outstanding offer without any communication to the offeree and, indeed,
without any opportunity for the offeror's estate to appropriate the
benefits of the contract proposed by the deceased offeror."1 The mailbox
rule allows formation of a contract even though the offeror is unaware of
the contract's formation. 12  And finally, consumer assent to standard
form contracts can be problematic if the consumer would object to one
or more terms in the contract, the merchant knows this, and the merchant
also knows-and even relies on the fact that-the consumer will not
discover the objectionable term because the consumer will not read the
form. 13
These doctrines should be reassessed and reevaluated in light of
modern objective theory and in light of their historical context. Should
this analysis reveal that the bases for these doctrines are no longer
compelling, then the rules should be revised to reflect the autonomy
concerns inherent in the objective theory of contract formation. Part II
of this Article discusses the objective theory of contracts, its history, and
the underlying goals it seeks to achieve. 14 Part III discusses the "death
of offeror" rule, its inconsistency with objective theory, and how the
doctrine should be reformed so as to comport with objective theory.
15
Part IV undertakes the same analysis with respect to the mailbox rule,'
6
and Part V does the same for consumer assent to standard form
contracts. 17 Part VI offers a brief conclusion, culminating with a plea
for the law on contract formation to be more fully harmonized with the
objective theory of contracts.' 8
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a); Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250
(K.B. 1818).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211; JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 7 CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 29.8, at 402 (rev. ed. 2002) (describing the traditional "duty to read" rule regarding
standard form contracts and its relationship to the objective theory of contracts).
11. See infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 116-144 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 160-187 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 19-80 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 81-115 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 116-159 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 160-198 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text.
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II. THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTS
A. History of the Objective Theory of Contracts
Contracting is quintessentially a consensual activity. 19  One
commonly cited definition of contract is a "legally enforceable
agreement." 20  Agreement is defined by the Restatement as "a
manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons."
2'
The classical mechanisms for determining mutual assent are the offer
and acceptance.22 However, these mechanisms are simply means to an
end--determining whether the parties both agreed on the same thing.
That inquiry is at the heart of contract law.
The history of contract law reveals two ways of analyzing mutual
assent: the objective theory based on what the parties communicated,
and the subjective theory based on what the parties thought.23  Of
course, applying either of these two theories, in most contracts, leads to
a singular result, namely mutual assent. Nevertheless, courts and
commentators have struggled philosophically throughout the
development of contract doctrine to determine the proper approach to
determining assent.24
19. See generally Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269
(1986).
20. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 1.1, at 2.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (1981).
22. Id. §§ 17-70.
23. See Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460, 464 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing MORTON J. HORwITz, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 180-88 (1977); Samuel Williston, Mutual Assent
in the Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL, L. REv. 85 (1919); Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760 (2d
Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring)).
24. Newman, 778 F.2d at 464; PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 26-27 ("A debate has raged as to
whether the assent of the parties should be actual mental assent so that there is a 'meeting of the minds'
or whether assent should be determined solely from objective manifestations of intent-namely what a
party says and does rather than what a party subjectively intends or believes or assumes." (footnote
omitted)); Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760-61 (Frank., J., concurring) ("In the early days of this century a
struggle went on between the respective proponents of two theories of contracts, (a) the 'actual intent'
theory-or 'meeting of the minds' or 'will' theory-and (b) the so-called 'objective' theory."); I E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 208 (3d ed. 2004) ("This question
provoked one of the most significant doctrinal struggles in the development of contract law, that
between the subjective and objective theories."); JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON
CONTRACTS § 30, at 62 (4th ed. 2001) ("[A] great deal of controversy was spawned over the question of
whether the actual mental assent (subjective) of the parties was required, or whether the expression or
manifestation of that assent (objective) would control regardless of any subjective intention."); Herman
Oliphant, The Duration and Termination of an Offer, 18 MICH. L. REv. 201, 201 (1920) ("P[rofessor]
Williston has recently pointed out the change which the law of the formation of simple contracts
underwent during the first century of its development. The change is fundamental. Originally the courts
thought of a simple contract as involving an actual concurrence of the minds of the parties. Gradually
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At one end of the spectrum is the subjective approach, requiring a
"meeting of the minds." This approach, now mostly defunct, focused on
the actual, literal intentions of the parties.2 5 "The subjectivists looked to
actual assent. Both parties had to actually assent to an agreement for
there to be a contract., 26 Courts used outward manifestations of intent
merely as evidence of the inner thoughts of the contracting party.2 7
At the other end of the spectrum is the objective approach. This
approach analyzes the outward appearance, or manifestation, of the
parties' intention. Judge Learned Hand wrote one of the most
memorable descriptions of objective theory:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, it were
proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the words,
intended something else than the usual meaning which the law imposes
upon them, he would still be held unless there were some mutual
mistake, or something else of the sort.28
Similarly, in his famous lectures set forth in The Common Law,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated, "The law has nothing to do with the
actual state of the parties' minds. In contract, as elsewhere, it must go
by externals, and judge parties by their conduct., 29  Similarly, Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell observed, "In truth, mental acts or acts
of the will are not the materials out of which promises are made; a
physical act on the part of the promisor is indispensable; and when the
this conception was supplanted by the notion that the objective and not the subjective state of mind of
the parties is controlling." (footnote omitted) (citing Williston, supra note 23)).
25. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA.
L. REV. 821, 898 (1992) ("A 'will theory' traces the obligatory nature of contracts to the fact that parties
have subjectively chosen to assume an obligation. According to this conception of consent, when one
does not subjectively consent one has not 'really' consented." (footnote omitted)).
26. Newman, 778 F.2d at 464 (footnote omitted) (citing HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 180-88;
Williston, supra note 23; Ricketts, 153 F.2d at 760 (Frank, J., concurring)). As Professor Farnsworth
states in his treatise:
The subjectivists looked to the actual or subjective intentions of the parties. The
subjectivists did not go so far as to advocate that subjective assent alone was sufficient to
make a contract. Even under the subjective theory there had to be some manifestation of
assent. But actual assent to the agreement on the part of both parties was necessary, and
without it there could be no contract. In the much-abused metaphor, there had to be a
"meeting of the minds."
I FARNSWORTH, supra note 24, § 3.6, at 208-09 (footnote omitted).
27. Newman, 778 F.2d at 464.
28. Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
29. HOLMES, supra note I, at 309.
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required physical act has been done, only a physical act can undo it."
30
More recently, Judge Frank Easterbrook has observed that "'intent' does
not invite a tour through [the plaintiffs] cranium, with [the plaintiff] as
the guide. 31
Ultimately, objective theory has prevailed as the unifying principle
governing the formation of contracts.32 Many historical accounts
suggest that early contract law focused on the subjective approach
before courts finally settled on an objective approach.33 However,
Professor Perillo suggests that, actually, the objective theory has always
dominated contract doctrine in spite of much rhetoric reflecting the
theoretical ideal of actual subjective unanimity of assent.34 The
subjective rhetoric peaked in the mid-nineteenth century before giving
way to objective approaches. 35  Perillo attributes this final shift to
objective theory, in part, to the mid-nineteenth century change in the
rules of evidence to allow litigants to testify for themselves.36
30. C.C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 244 (2d ed. 1880).
31. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987).
32. Newman, 778 F.2d at 465 ("By the end of the nineteenth century the objective approach to
the mutual assent requirement had become predominant, and courts continue to use it today." (citing E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.6, at 114 (1982))); Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761-62
(2d Cit. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring) ("At any rate, the sponsors of complete 'objectivity' in contracts
largely won out in the wider generalizations of the Restatement of Contracts and in some judicial
pronouncements." (footnotes omitted) (citing SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 35 (rev. ed. 1936);
RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY §§ 70, 71, 503 (1941); Hotchkiss, 200 F. at 293)). In his treatise on
contract law, Professor Murray states the resolution in favor of objective theory as follows:
The controversy has been resolved. Contract law abandoned the theory of subjective
intention as unworkable. A legion of cases support the view that the outward
manifestations of the parties-their expressions-will be viewed as the exclusive
evidence of the parties' intentions rather than assertions of their subjective intention....
There can be no doubt ... that the objective theory is clearly established throughout the
country.
MURRAY, supra note 24, § 30, at 63-64 (citations omitted).
33. Perillo, supra note 4, at 427-29 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN
AMERICA 87 (1965); HORWITZ, supra note 23; GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 12 (1974)).
Perillo stated that he was sometimes stunned by generalizations such as this one: "A standard history of
contract doctrine represents that, from the sixteenth to the early nineteenth century, contract formation
depended upon a subjective 'meeting of the minds."' Perillo, supra note 4, at 428 n. 11 (alteration in
original) (quoting Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997,
1042 (1985)).
34. Perillo, supra note 4, at 428.
35. Id.
36. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 27. Professor Perillo has noted that, historically, courts have
used three different approaches to contractual intent. First is the "medieval" objective approach, which
is purely objective and does not take the individual knowledge of the other party into account at all.
Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 627, 628 (2002) (citing Joseph
M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 427, 451 (2000)). The second approach is a purely subjective one, not taking into account any
objective viewpoint. Id. The third approach is the modem one, which is a modified objective approach,
THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRA CTS
B. Definition of Objective Theory
As previously stated, objective theory determines mutual assent by
evaluating external conduct. Thus, subjective, secretly held intent
contrary to the outward manifestations of a party is, under the objective
theory, irrelevant to contract formation.37 As Holmes stated in The
Common Law, "[T]he making of a contract does not depend on the state
of the parties' minds, it depends on their overt acts." 38  However,
modem approaches to objective theory have become more flexible by
taking into account the superior knowledge of the person to whom the
manifestations are made. Thus, one modem formulation of objective
theory is that "[a] party's intention will be held to be what a reasonable
person in the position of the other party would conclude the
manifestation to mean. 39  This definition retains the attributes of
classical objective theory by viewing assent from the vantage point of
the "reasonable person. '4°  But the definition improves upon "pure"
external objective theory, and answers many of its critics, by taking into
account some subjectivity and expressly incorporating the vantage point
of someone "in the position of" the actual recipient of the manifestation.
A recurring example of reconciling external manifestations and
contrary subjective knowledge is the party who professes to have "only
been joking" when making otherwise contractually operative
manifestations of assent. Objective theory rejects this argument unless
the other party knew or reasonably should have known of this actual
intent, that is, of the joke.41 Lucy v. Zehmer is an illustrative case.42 In
Lucy, two parties discussed the sale of real estate.43 Lucy offered to buy
it, and his offer was, no one would dispute, serious.44 Zehmer externally
acted like he seriously intended to sell the property, but he was
which also takes into account any superior knowledge held by the other party. Id. at 629.
37. Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer
Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1266 & n.16 (1993) ("In the formation of contracts it was
long ago settled that secret intent was immaterial; only overt acts being considered in the determination
of such mutual assent as that branch of law requires." (quoting I SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 26 (1920))).
38. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 307.
39. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 28.
40. See Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring) ("The
objectivists transferred from the field of torts that stubborn anti-subjectivist, the 'reasonable
man' .... ").
41. See PERILLO,supra note 3, § 2.3, at 28-29.
42. 84 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1954).
43. Id. at 517-19.
44. Id. at 518.
2008) 1125
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concealing the fact that he never intended to sell the property.45 Zehmer
testified at trial that he was only "needling" Lucy because he did not
think Lucy could afford the land.46 The court determined that the
contract was binding because a reasonable person in Lucy's position
would have believed Zehmer genuinely intended to sell.47 That is, the
court held that Lucy was entitled to rely on what he reasonably thought
Zehmer meant when Zehmer outwardly agreed to sell the property.48
The holding is entirely consistent with the objective theory of
contracts.49
Leonard v. Pepsico, Inc. provides another example of a court using
the objective theory reasoning. 50 In Leonard, Pepsi aired a commercial
explaining its "Pepsi Points" system whereby consumers could obtain
"Pepsi Points" when they bought Pepsi products and could redeem those
points for merchandise. 51  The commercial highlighted available
merchandise, including sunglasses (175 points), a leather jacket (1,450
points), and a military Harrier jet (7,000,000 points).52 The commercial
was obviously designed to be humorous, insofar as the availability of the
Harrier jet was concerned.53 However, Leonard attempted to accept
Pepsi's alleged "offer" of a Harrier jet in return for 7,000,000 Pepsi
points.54 The court rejected Leonard's claim that a contract had been
formed.55 Instead, the court reasoned in detail why the commercial was
a farce, and further why it would be perceived as such by a reasonable
person.56  Therefore, under objective theory, the court ruled that no
45. Id. at 518-19.
46. Id. at 519-20.
47. Id. at 521-22.
48. Id.
49. The testimony also indicated that both Lucy and Zehmer had been drinking before and during
the negotiation. Id. at 518-20. However, the court found that both parties nevertheless comprehended
the meaning of their actions and thus possessed sufficient capacity to contract. Id. at 521-22.
50. 88 F. Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 210 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000).
51. Id. at 118-19.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 120.
54. Id. at 119. Leonard did not actually drink the millions of Pepsis required to obtain the points.
Id. Rather, he discovered that Pepsi would sell the points for 10 cents each, and therefore he submitted a
check for approximately $700,000, to buy the points and thereby redeem a Harrier jet. Id.
55. Id. at 127-30.
56. Id. In a wonderful part of the opinion, the court said that
Plaintiffs insistence that the commercial appears to be a serious offer requires the
Court to explain why the commercial is funny. Explaining why a joke is funny is a
daunting task; as the essayist E.B. White has remarked, "Humor can be dissected, as a
frog can, but the thing dies in the process. .. "
Id. at 128 (alteration in original) (quoting GERALD R. FORD, HUMOR AND THE PRESIDENCY 23 (1987)).
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reasonable person would think Pepsi had the intent to be contractually
bound to convey a Harrier jet in exchange for Pepsi points.57
Lucy and Leonard nicely illustrate the gist of the objective theory of
contracts-promisees can take the manifestations of the promisor at face
value for what such manifestations reasonably appear to mean, unless
the promisee actually knows otherwise. This is the bedrock principle in
the modern analysis of mutual assent to contracts.
C. Policies Served by Objective Theory
1. Evidentiary Concerns
Because the remainder of this Article discusses needed changes in
certain doctrines on the basis of their inconsistency with the objective
theory of contracts, some exploration of the underlying policies and
rationales of the objective theory is warranted. First, as mentioned
previously, Professor Perillo noted the evidentiary pragmatism of using
the objective theory of contracts after the rules were generally changed
to allow litigants to testify on their behalf.58 Objective theory thus
alleviated the concern that litigants would misrepresent their subjective
mental intent while under oath because evidence of such subjective
intent was no longer substantively relevant to the issue of contract
formation.
Of course, tangible evidence of mutual assent has always been
needed. Absent telepathic powers, humans can only communicate
through outward manifestations. 59 Thus, "Courts [have] always taken
the pragmatic view that unmanifested intention could not be the basis for
making or accepting an offer."60 A mental determination to make or
accept an offer, which is not revealed to the other party, is inoperative.61
Mere internal desire to make an offer, or to accept one, has never been
57. Id. at 127-30.
58. See PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 27.
59. See THERON METCALF, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, AS APPLIED BY COURTS OF
LAW 14 (1874) ("There must necessarily be some medium of communication, by which the 'union of
minds' may be ascertained and manifested. Among men, this medium is language, symbolical, oral, or
written. A proposal is made by one party, and is acceded to by the other, in some kind of language
mutually intelligible; and this is mutual assent. Persons who are deaf and dumb contract only by
symbolical or written language. The language of contracts at auction is often wholly symbolical. A nod
or wink by one party, and a blow of a hammer given by the other, evince mutual assent.").
60. MURRAY, supra note 24, § 30, at 62.
61. LAURENCE P. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9, at 9 (2d ed. 1965).
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held sufficient. "Any other rule would be absurd.,
62
2. Reliance and Economic Concerns
Reliance concerns also constitute a key policy rationale for objective
theory. That is, "Proponents of the reliance theory of contracts profess
to see the foundation of contract law not in the will of the promisor to be
bound but in the expectations engendered by, and the promisee's
consequent reliance upon, the promise.' '63 A difficult situation arises
when an internal intent differs from an externally manifested intent.
Objective theory imports significance only to the external manifestation,
not the purely internal intent. As Professor Murray illustrates:
If A makes an offer to which B manifests assent, may A later say, "I'm
sorry, but we have no contract since I changed my mind a moment before
you announced your acceptance?" The possible hardship to one who had
relied upon what had been expressed, only to discover that he had built
his house of expectations upon the shifting sands of subjective intention,
was unacceptable. Under that analysis, no system of contract law could
ever prove workable since it would be impossible to prove the subjective
intention of either party at any time.
64
As Professor Murray states, no other form of contract law would be
workable. 65  His rationale relates to reliance by parties on the
manifestations of others so as to facilitate a system of contract law that
in turn facilitates exchanges of value in an economic system.66 In fact,
this rationale is closely related to the requirement of consideration for an
enforceable contract since consideration involves reciprocal inducement
of promises. 67 "The objective theory is strongly supported by those who
place the basis of contract law upon the promisee's justified reliance
upon a promise or upon the needs of society and trade. An objective test
62. MURRAY, supra note 24, § 30, at 62.
63. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 1.4(d), at 9; see also WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 7, § 4:1, at
334-35 ("[T]he fundamental basis of contract in the common law is reliance on an outward act (that is, a
promise), as may be seen by the early development of the law of consideration as compared with that of
mutual assent.").
64. MURRAY, supra note 24, § 30, at 62.
65. Id.
66. See Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 368 (1921) ("[T]he
fundamental idea on which the action of assumpsit and the development of simple contracts rested, was
that reliance on a promise-the reliance being induced by the promisor's request of an act or counter-
promise of the other party-caused an obligation to arise.").
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981) ("(1) To constitute consideration, a
performance or a return promise must be bargained for. (2) A performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in
exchange for that promise.").
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is believed to protect the 'fundamental principle of the security of
business transactions."' 68 Hence, in a very real sense, objective theory is
necessary for a workable system of commerce and economic exchange
because it forms contractual liability based on the external
manifestations that parties may predictably rely upon.
69
3. Freedom of Contract and Private Autonomy
Contract law is, above all else, a consensual endeavor. 70  Parties are
generally free to contract on whatever terms they wish, whenever they
wish.71 By constructing a system of contract enforcement backed by the
coercive powers of the state, the state has opted to allow parties the
freedom and power to order and regulate their own economic affairs.
72
"By giving effect to the parties' intentions, the law of contracts is based
on respect for party autonomy. 73 Personal autonomy and freedom are
the hallmarks of the Anglo-American common law of contracts, and
"[c]onsent is the human vehicle for exercising freedom or autonomy.,
74
The objective theory of contracts furthers the ideal of individual
autonomy. Limiting contract terms to what is externally manifested
gives promisees much more control over their own affairs. When the
promisee is entitled to rely on gestures that can be objectively verified-
versus having to discern the promisor's internal cognition, which may
68. Daniel P. O'Gorman, A State of Disarray: The "Knowing and Voluntary" Standard for
Releasing Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 111-12
(2005) (quoting JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 25 (2d ed. 1977)).
69. See Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[l]f intent
were wholly subjective ... no one could know the effect of a commercial transaction until years after
the documents were inked. That would be a devastating blow to business."); Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153
F.2d 757, 761 n.2 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., concurring) ("The 'actual intent' theory, said the
objectivists, being 'subjective' and putting too much stress on unique individual motivations, would
destroy that legal certainty and stability which a modem commercial society demands. They depicted
the 'objective' standard as a necessary adjunct of a 'free enterprise' economic system.").
70. See generally Barnett, supra note 19.
71. See Williston, supra note 66, at 373 ("As theories of individual freedom thus seemed to
require that no obligations or defences to obligations should be allowed unless willed by the parties, so
on the other hand the same theories led to opposition to restrictions being placed on the kind of contracts
which they in fact did will.").
72. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 1.4(c), at 8 ("[linsofar as the law of contract places the coercions of
the legal order behind the terms of a contract settled by private parties, the legal order may and indeed
should set socially approved limits to the support which it gives to the terms which one party is in a
position to impose on the other." (alteration in original) (quoting JULIUS STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
LAW AND JUSTICE 253 (1966))).
73. Perillo, supra note 4, at 427.
74. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1067, 1111 (2006); see also Kennedy, supra
note 2, at 131 (citing Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941)).
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vary from what is externally manifested-the promisee can better
process information and order affairs accordingly.75 The promisee's
affairs can be planned based on what is spoken or written,
communications that can also be subsequently referenced when
questions regarding performance and obligation arise. Subjective,
internal equivocations or doubts are of no consequence to the parties'
contractual affairs and thus cannot create havoc in the parties'
reasonable expectations. Thus, parties have greater autonomy and
control over their own affairs when the objective theory of contracts is
followed.
The objective theory of contracts also furthers the ideals of freedom
of contract and personal autonomy by limiting the effectiveness of
manifestations to gestures known to the other party. Recall that the
modem definition of the objective theory of contracts is that "[a] party's
intention will be held to be what a reasonable person in the position of
the other party would conclude the manifestation to mean., 76 Not only
does this definition consider to the substantive content of the external
manifestation as determinative of whether a contract exists, but it also
considers how that manifestation is perceived by the "other party.
77
The "other party perspective" of the objective theory formulation has,
however, another aspect that may be overlooked at first glance. This
other aspect is, simply, that the manifestation must be actually received
in the first place for the other party's superior knowledge to be overlaid
onto the content of the manifestation. Unless the external manifestation
of assent is actually received by the other party, a court cannot
determine what the other party (or a reasonable person in the party's
position) would understand the manifestation to mean. Note that such
delivery and receipt of communication is also inherent in the act of
promising. 78  "The very idea of a promise necessarily involves its
communication to the promisee. ' '79 Absent receipt of the manifestation,
any discussion of whether the two parties have come to a position of
mutual assent is premature or even moot.
The objective theory's premise of the other party's receipt of the
manifestation squarely furthers the ideals of personal autonomy and
freedom of contract. The process of contracting is not purely consensual
75. See Empro Mfg. Co. v. Ball-Co Mfg., Inc., 870 F.2d 423,425 (7th Cir. 1989).
76. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 28.
77. Id.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981) ("An offer is the manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it."); see also id. § 50(3) ("Acceptance by a promise requires
that the offeree complete every act essential to the making of the promise.").
79. SIMPSON, supra note 61, § 9, at 9.
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if the parties are not filly aware of all external actions that may
empower or bind them to a contract. The parties obviously cannot be
aware of external manifestations unless they receive them or otherwise
learn of their existence. By limiting operative manifestations to those
that are received and known by the parties to the negotiation, individuals
are empowered with the increased ability to order their own affairs.
This serves the principle of freedom of contracts, and helps to explain
why the objective theory has "predominated in the common law of
contracts since time immemorial. 80
III. THE "DEATH OF OFFEROR" RULE
A. The Rule, Its History, and Its Inconsistency with Objective Theory
If the offeror dies before the offer has been accepted by the offeree,
the general rule is that the offer is terminated and the offeree no longer
has the power of acceptance. 81  The applicable Restatement section
provides: "An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when
the... offeror dies or is deprived of legal capacity to enter into the
proposed contract. ' 2  The rule's primary reason likely was the
prevailing sentiment that one "cannot contract with a dead man."83 The
rule's origins certainly appear to pre-date the founding of the American
Republic, going back to the French civil law, and even probably to
80. Perillo, supra note 4, at 428.
81. MURRAY, supra note 24, § 42(E) at 124; PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.20(c), at 92-93;
Oliphant, supra note 24, at 209; Arthur L. Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting
Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169, 198 (1917).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48. Section 48 also provides that the offer is
terminated when the offeree dies. Id. This situation does not necessarily implicate the same questions
of objective theory and contract formation. Professor Ricks has made a similar conclusion:
Death of offeree cases differ from death of offeror cases both factually and theoretically.
The death of offeree cases are thought to rest on the quite reasonable notion that the offer
is personal to the offeree, and not assignable, so that the death of the offeree leaves no
one left to accept the offer. Of course, difficulties with this rationale exist. The rationale
might over-emphasize the "personalness" of the offer to the offeree. Moreover, an agent
whose agency was coupled with an interest could accept on the offeree's behalf, even
though the offeree had died. This brief discussion proves that the policies animating the
results in cases of death of the offeree differ from those animating cases involving death
of the offeror.
Val D. Ricks, The Death of Offers, 79 IND. L.J. 667, 672-73 n.14 (2004) (citations omitted).
83. Corbin, supra note 81, at 198; Oliphant, supra note 24, at 210 ("The courts say that the
reason the offer is terminated by the death of the offerer is obvious. A contract cannot be made with a
dead man.").
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Roman law.
84
For all of the rule's long-settled nature and origins, it is
unquestionably inconsistent with the objective theory, and "there is
grave doubt whether this rule is desirable." 85  The drafters of the
Restatement stated that the rule is "a relic of the obsolete view that a
contract requires a 'meeting of minds,' and it is out of harmony with the
modem doctrine that a manifestation of assent is effective without
regard to actual mental assent." 86  This is the sentiment of most
commentators with regard to an offeror's death that is unknown by the
offeree, though most think that the rule is sensible when the offeree is
aware of the death before accepting.87
The reason that the rule is inconsistent with objective theory is fairly
straightforward. Assume that A makes an offer to B. Without B's
knowledge, A dies. Does B still have the power of acceptance? Not
under the subjective theory; once A died, it was no longer possible for A
and B to both have a concurrent, subjective intent to enter into the
contract since A's intent perished with his life. 88  However, under the
objective theory, B undoubtedly should retain the power of acceptance.
A's prior manifestation of intent to enter into the contract-the offer-
has not been revoked in any communication directed toward B. "One to
whom an offer is made has a right to assume that it remains open
according to its terms until he has actual notice to the contrary."89 To
protect B's expectation, B should continue to have the power of
acceptance until B receives communication or obtains knowledge that A
84. Professor Ricks pinpoints the first mention of the rule in American caselaw to Mactier's
Administrators v. Frith, in 1830. Ricks, supra note 82, at 673 (citing Mactier's Adm'rs v. Frith, 6
Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830)). Mactier's cited the French commentator Robert Joseph Pothier for the rule.
Id. (citing ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITt DU CONTRAT DE VENTE (1806)). Professor Ricks, after an
exhaustive tracking down of the origins of the rule, concludes that "[t]he dying offer rule appears to be a
rather textbook example of the kind of borrowing from Roman, natural law, and medieval philosophy
described by James Gordley." Id. at 674 n.23 (citing JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991)).
85. MURRAY, supra note 24, § 42(E), at 124.
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 cmt. a.
87. See PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.20(c), at 93 ("The majority view is a frequently criticized
relic of the subjective theory. It does not conform to the objective theory because the offeree should be
charged only with what the offeree knows or should know of the offeror's situation.").
88. Professor Ricks, in a fascinating part of his article, actually challenges this conventional
thinking, noting that, as a purely factual matter, no one can say for sure whether A's soul-and thus his
will--continues or not after physical death, and in the event that it does, whether it would be concerned
with matters such as contracts and subjectively intending to carry them out. Ricks, supra note 82, at
675-76. Professor Ricks concedes the obvious evidentiary difficulties, and I do not address them further
here.
89. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 306-07.
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may no longer wish to enter into the contract.90
Objections to this conclusion should be addressed. One criticism is
that A does not subjectively intend to enter into the contract. But as
illustrated previously, under the now-dominant objective theory of
contracts, subjective intention is irrelevant, and the lack thereof should
not prohibit the formation of a contract. 91 Another criticism is that no
one is left for B to contract with-A is a dead man. But this objection is
not compelling because an entity succeeds A-A's estate.92  As
Professor Corbin has observed, "the law has no difficulty ... in creating
legal relations with the dead man's personal representative., 93  Thus,
under existing contract law, if B accepts moments before A dies, a
binding contract is formed, and A's subsequent death does not "undo"
the contract.94 Stretched to its extreme, this could mean that a few
seconds difference between the acceptance and the offeror's death is all
that stands between a fully formed contract and a terminated offer. And
if a dead person's estate can be held to fully binding contracts, then why
should the estate not be held to the powers of acceptance created by their
90. Professor Corbin, in his influential treatise on contracts, stated this about the rule:
It is very generally said that the death of the offeror terminates the offeree's power of
acceptance even though the offeree has no knowledge of such death. Such general
statements arose out of the earlier notion that a contract cannot be made without an actual
meeting of minds at a single moment of time, a notion that has long been abandoned.
The rule has also been supposed to follow by some logical necessity from the dictum that
it takes two persons to make a contract. It is not contrary to that dictum to deny that
death terminates power to accept; the offer was made by a living man and is accepted by
another living man.
I ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 54, at 227-28 (1963).
91. Ricks, supra note 82, at 676-77 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 cmt. a
(1981)); 1 CORB1N, supra note 90, § 54, at 227 ("Such general statements arose out of the earlier notion
that a contract cannot be made without an actual meeting of minds at a single moment of time, a notion
that has long been abandoned."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §3.18 (3d ed. 1999);
WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 7, § 5.19; MURRAY, supra note 24, § 42(E); PERILLO, supra note 3,
§ 2.34; Oliphant, supra note 24, at 210 ("But no concurrence of wills is necessary."); W.J. Wagner,
Some Problems of Revocation and Termination of Offers, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 138, 152 (1963);
Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir. 1936) ("This rule has been criticized on the ground that
under the modem view of the formation of contracts, it is not the actual meeting of the minds of the
contracting parties that is the determining factor, but rather the apparent state of mind of the parties
embodied in an expression of mutual consent; so that the acceptance by an offeree of an offer, which is
apparently still open, should result in an enforceable contract notwithstanding the prior death of the
offeror unknown to the offeree."), rev'd on other grounds, 300 U.S. 31 (1937); New Headley Tobacco
Warehouse Co. v. Gentry's Ex'r, 212 S.W.2d 325, 327 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948) (same as Chain).
92. See 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 3 (2007) ("The estate of a deceased person is
not an entity known to the law, and is not a natural or an artificial person, but is merely a name to
indicate the sum total of assets and liabilities of a decedent." (footnotes omitted)).
93. Corbin, supra note 81, at 198.
94. See PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.20(c), at 93 ("If B accepts before A dies, there is a
contract... .").
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offers? Again, absent the explanation of outmoded subjective theory, no
particularly persuasive explanation exists, leading Corbin to state that
there is no "compelling necessity for [the rule's] existence."
95
Furthermore, certain offers do survive the death of the offeror:
irrevocable offers. In general, unless consideration was paid for an
option contract to make the offer irrevocable for a stated period of
* 96 thetime, or unless the option is irrevocable for any other reason,97 all
offers are generally revocable by the offeror until the time of acceptance.
But if an offeree pays consideration for an option, then death will not
terminate the offer. So, if A makes an offer to B, and A agrees to hold
the offer open for one year in exchange for B's paying A $100 (or even
$1) for this option (period of irrevocability), A's death would not
prevent B from enjoying the right to accept the underlying offer for one
year. If B accepts after A's death, a contract would be formed with A,
the deceased.
That the law already allows option contracts to be consummated with
dead people, as well as binding contracts to continue in force with dead
people, cuts against any argument that the "dying offer" rule is
necessary. A question may arise, however, if the contract cannot be
performed because of the death of the offeror. But the law already has a
remedy for this problem, in the form of the doctrine of impracticability.
Restatement section 261 provides the general rule of impracticability:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.
98
The very next section of the Restatement makes death one such
consideration: "If the existence of a particular person is necessary for the
performance of a duty, his death or such incapacity as makes
95. Corbin, supra note 81, at 198.
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37 ("Notwithstanding §§ 38-49, the power of
acceptance under an option contract is not terminated by rejection or counter-offer, by revocation, or by
death or incapacity of the offeror, unless the requirements are met for the discharge of a contractual
duty.").
97. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45(1) ("Where an offer invites an
offeree to accept by rendering a performance and does not invite a promissory acceptance, an option
contract is created when the offeree tenders or begins the invited performance or tenders a beginning of
it."); U.C.C. § 2-205 (2003) ("An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed record that by its
terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time
stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may the period of irrevocability
exceed three months.").
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261.
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performance impracticable is an event the non-occurrence of which was
a basic assumption on which the contract was made."
99
The import of the impracticability doctrine in this context is clear. If
a contract is formed and one of the parties dies, then the contract is
voidable if the decedent's continued survival was a basic assumption of
the parties. For example, say that A offers to provide B with personal
tutoring sessions in math. B accepts and A dies. A would be discharged
under the impracticability doctrine because A's survival is necessary for
A to do the tutoring. But note that not all contracts are necessarily
voidable upon the death of a party. For instance, contracts in which the
primary obligation is the payment of money would not generally be
voidable because the surviving party can make a claim on the assets of
the estate. The same would be true of an obligation to convey personal
or real property. The estate is empowered to effect such transfers
through the personal representatives.
Thus, no matter its origins and defenders, 00 the rule of offers
terminating upon the offeror's death is, without question, outmoded,
unnecessary, and undesirable. 101
B. The Solution: Discard the Rule in Favor ofAnalyzing Objective
Appearance of Intent
Solving the problem of the "dying offer" rule is simple: eliminate it.
99. Id. § 262.
100. Professor Val Ricks has written an excellent article on the "dying offer" problem, entitled
The Death of Offers. Ricks, supra note 82. In his article, Professor Ricks argues that the dying offer
rule, though incorrect in its assumption that subjective intent is required under modem contract law,
nevertheless should be retained because it reaches a just result in most situations. Id. at 670. Ricks
divides his analysis along three different fact scenarios which could arise: (a) when the offeree attempts
to accept the offer or rely on it after receiving notice of the offeror's death, (b) when the offeree attempts
to accept the offer before receiving notice of the offeror's death but in which no reliance on the offer
occurs, and (c) when the offeree, before receiving notice of the offeror's death, reasonably incurs costs
in reliance on the offer or on the offeree's reasonable belief in the existence of a completely formed
contract. Id. at 670-71. For situations (a) and (b), most of Ricks' rationale is connected with problems
caused by the offeror's death: the dead offeror can no longer perform, the offeree has no party to send an
acceptance, the offeree can speculate since the offeror can no longer revoke, and the offeror no longer
has any autonomy interests worthy of protection. Id. at 686-98. However, putting the estate into the
position as the successor to the offeror solves most of these problems. Ricks also says that the dying
offer rule is unjust in situation (c), but that courts could apply the principles of promissory estoppel to
protect an offeree who has relied on the offer or promise of the deceased offeror. Id. at 700-05 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90). While this is a wonderfully innovative and clever
solution, it is unnecessary, since discarding the dying offer rule in the first place would also solve the
problem in situation (c). Cf Oliphant, supra note 24, at 210 ("It is no answer to say that the offeree can,
in a proper case, recover on principles of quasi contracts because what is now being examined is the
merit of this rule in the law of contracts.").
101. See MURRAY, supra note 24, § 42(E), at 124.
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As Professor Corbin said long ago:
[T]here is not, as is often supposed, any compelling necessity for its
existence. It may be said that you cannot contract with a dead man; but
neither can you force a dead man to pay his debts contracted before his
death. Yet the law has no difficulty, in the latter case, in creating legal
relations with the dead man's personal representative, and there would be
no greater difficulty in declaring the power of acceptance to survive as
against the offeror's representative or in favor of the offeree's
representative. 102
The rule could easily be eliminated, and doing so would be in complete
accord with the objective theory of contracts. Given the long-standing
nature of the rule, any change would probably have to come by way of
legislation rather than court decision.' 03 But such changes have already
been implemented in certain contexts 10 4 and therefore could easily be
implemented on a universal basis. Contract law's existing doctrines can
easily fill in the vacuum left by eliminating the rule, and the doctrines
can provide adjudications that are more consistent with, and that
vindicate some of the underlying policies of, the rules on contract
formation specifically.
To illustrate how existing contract doctrine would handle the variety
of fact patterns that arise in this context, it is helpful to divide them into
three categories: scenarios where the offeree remains ignorant of the
offeror's death prior to acceptance; scenarios where the offeree
discovers the offeror's death prior to acceptance; and scenarios where, if
a contract is formed by the offeree's acceptance before knowledge of the
offeror's death is obtained, the doctrine of impracticability discharges
the offeror's estate from further obligation and liability under the formed
contract.
First, the objective theory clearly provides that if the offeree has no
knowledge of the death, then the offer should remain viable. Modem
objective theory states that "[a] party's intention will be held to be what
102. Corbin, supra note 81, at 198.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 48 cmt. a ("In the absence of legislation, the rule
remains in effect.").
104. Id. ("Some inroads have been made on the rule by statutes and decisions with respect to bank
deposits and collections, and by legislation with respect to powers of attorney given by servicemen."
(citing U.C.C. § 4-405; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 120 & cmt. a (1958))). The American
Law Institute has recently published the Third Restatement on Agency Law. That Restatement contains
a new provision, which is a change from prior law, and provides that death of a principal does not
terminate the agent's authority until the agent has notice of the death. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 3.07(2) (2006). This provision conforms the Restatement to an oft-cited federal decision, as
well as the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act. Ricks, supra note 82, at 682 (citing Schock v.
United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 185 (DR.I. 1999), aff'd on other grounds, 254 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001);
UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT § 4, 8A U.L.A. 255 (1979)).
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a reasonable person in the position of the other party would conclude the
manifestation to mean."' 0 5  The offeror, while alive, manifested an
intent, by making the offer, to be bound.'0 6 Absent knowledge of the
death, a reasonable person in the position of the offeree would assume
that the offer continued. "Under an objective theory, the contrary
holding [the offer survives] can readily be justified since there is no
difficulty in establishing manifested mutual assent even though the
offeror has died or become incapacitated, assuming the offeree is not
aware of the fact."' 0 7 Therefore, as long as the offeree remains ignorant
of the offeror's death, the offer should continue.
The next scenario to consider is the offeree who discovers that, prior
to accepting the offer, the offeror has died. Unlike the situation where
the offeree remains ignorant of the offeror's death, commentators have
universally assumed the modem soundness of the dying offer rule in the
case where the offeree becomes aware of the death since, they assume,
this automatically means that the offeree should realize the offeror no
longer intended to be bound. 10 8 This will be the case in many instances,
under objective theory, but a categorical application of the dying offer
rule would be unreasonable. Rather, absent the automatic dying offer
rule, objective theory should inquire whether the offeror's estate, under
the offeror's presumed wishes, continues assenting to the offer. The
impracticability analysis could probably help inform this inquiry. If a
contract, if formed, would be impossible to perform after the offeror
died, then objective theory would likely conclude that a reasonable
person in the position of the offeree would no longer perceive a
continuing intent to be bound. However, this will not be true for some
contracts, such as those in which the offeror was simply bound to pay
money or convey title to property. These actions could still be done by
the representative of the offeror's estate and may still be beneficial to the
estate and all of the heirs. Moreover, in some instances, the facts may
clearly evidence the offeror's intent for the offer to survive the
offeror.10 9 If the evidence indicates that a reasonable person in the
105. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 28.
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 ("An offer is the manifestation of willingness
to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that
bargain is invited and will conclude it.").
107. MURRAY, supra note 24, § 42(E), at 125.
108. See Oliphant, supra note 24, at 209 ("It seems clear that, where the offeree leams of the death
of the offerer before he has acted in reliance upon the expectation aroused by the offer, he cannot bind
the offerer's estate by a subsequent acceptance."); PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.20(c), at 93 ("The rule is
logical if the offeree is aware of the offeror's death because knowledge of death would be tantamount to
a revocation ...."); MURRAY, supra note 24, § 42(E), at 125 ("If the offeree is aware of it [the offeror's
death], clearly there should no longer be a power of acceptance.").
109. Professor Ricks found one such case, an admitted "rare scenario," which was In re Estate of
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position of the offeree would still believe that the offeror's estate wished
to proceed with the contract, then there is no reason to arbitrarily take
that ability away through the automatic application of the dying offer
rule. Thus, in the situation where the offeree discovers that the offeror
has died, the offer should not be automatically terminated. Rather,
courts should analyze the continuing nature of the offeror's manifested
intent from the vantage point of a reasonable person in the position of
the offeree. If a reasonable person would assume the offeror, via the
offeror's estate, no longer wished to be bound, then the death in effect
should be held to constitute a revocation."10 If, however, a reasonable
person would assume the offeror, via the offeror's estate, wished to still
be bound, then the offeree should remain free to accept the offer and
form a contract.
The scenario whereby an offeree signals his acceptance prior to the
offeror's death, thereby forming a contract, is more sympathetic than the
scenario where a knowing offeree attempts acceptance. As discussed
earlier, however, the question remains as to whether the offeror, via the
offeror's estate, should be discharged by the doctrine of
impracticability.' And this should be analyzed under this well-
established doctrine: if the contract assumed the offeror's continued
survival because his personal performance is necessary to the contract-
such as an employment contract or other personal services contract-
then the impracticability doctrine serves to free the offeror's estate from
any further liability or obligation on the contract. 112 The offeree, prior to
learning of the offeror's death, may have incurred expenditures or may
have relied on the offeror's offer and assurances. In this instance, courts
would have recourse to the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as noted by
Severtson, No. C7-97-1249, 1998 WL 88253 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1998), cited in Ricks, supra note
82, at 705-07. Severtson involved an elderly neighbor who offered to sell her real property to her
younger next door neighbor. Id. at * 1. The written offer signed by the elderly neighbor-intended to be
an option contract with binding consideration but the "neighborly" seller refused payment-stated that
the "[p]urchase price agreed upon is $100,000, to be paid to Helen Severtson if living or to the Estate of
Helen Severtson is she is deceased or incapacitated." Id. Therefore, in this particular case, clearly the
offeror "apparently intended her offer to survive her." Ricks, supra note 82, at 706.
110. The revocation, in this case, would most likely be considered indirect, since it was not
effected by direct communication from the offeror to the offeree. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 43 ("An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeror takes definite
action inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract and the offeree acquires reliable
information to that effect."), and Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 ("An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree
receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract.").
11. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.20(c), at 93 ("If [the offeree] accepts before [the offeror] dies,
there is a contract and the only question presented would be whether [the offeror's] estate would have
the defense of impossibility of performance.").
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 261-62.
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Professor Ricks." 13 Under that doctrine:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires. 14
Thus, if an offeror should have expected that his offer would have
induced action, then recovery should be had for any such action or
reliance, even after the offeror's death. Justice would countenance this
result, and it provides some consolation to an otherwise disadvantaged
offeree who is deprived of the full expectation of the originally proposed
contract because of the offeror's death after formation.
The elimination of the automatic dying offer rule, in favor of the
utilization of traditional objective theory buttressed with promissory
estoppel and the impracticability doctrine, vindicates all of the
underlying purposes of contract law furthered by the objective theory.
The offeree's personal autonomy is preserved because the offeree retains
the power to decide, on the offeree's own terms, whether to manifest an
acceptance and thereby create a binding contractual obligation between
the parties. Furthermore, where the offeree learns of the offeror's death
before attempting an acceptance, allowing the reasonable expectations
of the offeree to serve as the barometer of contract formation, rather than
automatically terminating the offer, gives maximum freedom of contract
and autonomy to the offeree. It also gives the same autonomy to the
estate of the offeror, which may wish to consummate a contract for the
good of the estate, its heirs, and its creditors. 15 Therefore, eliminating
the Death of Offeror rule would serve these important ends of contract
law while simplifying and harmonizing this area of the law.
113. See Ricks, supra note 82, at 700-05.
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1).
115. One concern of this changed rule may be the possible imposition on personal representatives
of the offeror's estate. A fair criticism is that the personal representative may possibly be subject to the
acceptance of offers made by the offeror while alive, of which the personal representative has no
knowledge, and which therefore make it difficult to adequately plan and administer the assets of the
offeror's estate. However, this is already true to some extent with existing contracts and assets of the
decedent. There is every reason to believe that, in many if not most instances, the offeror will have kept
some type of record of the offer he made in his personal effects and files, just as he does with existing
asset and contract records. Perhaps, with any legislation implementing the elimination of the dying offer
rule, a provision could be made whereby the offeree, upon discovering the death of the offeree, has an
obligation to give prompt notification to the offeror's personal representative of both the existence of the
offer, and the offeree's intention to consider the offer open.
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IV. THE MAILBOX RULE
A. The Rule, Its History, and Its Inconsistency with Objective Theory
Virtually all promissory communications relating to the formation or
destruction of a potential bilateral contract must be communicated and
received--except one. When the offer invites acceptance by mail or a
similar medium, an acceptance returned in the mail is effective
immediately upon dispatch.1 16  The Mailbox Rule,' 17 as its known,
makes the acceptance operative from the moment it is placed in the mail
or otherwise put out of the offeree's possession, even if the acceptance
never reaches the offeror. 18 Therefore, the rule allows formation of a
contract by the offeree's dispatched acceptance before the offeror learns
of the acceptance. 19
The mailbox rule traces its origin to Adams v. Lindsell.120  In Adams,
the defendant sent a written offer to sell wool to the plaintiffs by mail.'
21
The defendants misdirected the letter so the plaintiffs did not receive the
offer for a day or so. 122 The plaintiffs, desirous of accepting the offer,
promptly posted an acceptance letter in the mail. 123 However, because
the acceptance did not arrive on the day that the defendants expected
it-a consequence they unknowingly caused by the offer's
misdirection-the defendants assumed the plaintiffs had decided not to
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 ("Unless the offer provides otherwise, ... an
acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes the
manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether
it ever reaches the offeror ....").
117. See, e.g., Dennis Patterson, Langdell's Legacy, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 196, 198 (1995).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a); Beth A. Eisler, Default Rules for Contract
Formation by Promise and the Need for Revision of the Mailbox Rule, 79 Ky. L.J. 557, 563 (1990)
(citing United Leasing, Inc. v. Commonwealth Land Title Agency of Tucson, Inc., 656 P.2d 1246, 1250
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.22 (1990)). The
benefit of this rule depends, however, on the acceptance being dispatched properly, such as to the
correct addressee and with the proper address. See PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.23(a), at 110 ("The
[mailbox rule] prevails generally throughout the U.S., with the qualification that the acceptance must be
dispatched in a proper manner." (footnote omitted)).
119. See MURRAY, supra note 24, § 47(A).
120. 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818). See also Valerie Watnick, The Electronic Formation of
Contracts and the Common Law "Mailbox Rule, " 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 175, 177-78 (2004) ("This rule
of law, oft-called the 'mailbox rule,' originated in England at a time of widespread use of the post.
Today, as more efficient methods of communication are routinely used, the rule's application has
declined." (citing Adams, 106 Eng. Rep. 250; Paul Fasciano, Note, Internet Electronic Mail: A Last
Bastion for the Mailbox Rule, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 971, 977 n. 17 (1997))).
121. 106 Eng. Rep. at 250.
122. Id. at 250-51.
123. Id. at 251.
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accept the deal, and they sold their wool to a third party. 124 The court
was called upon to decide whether acceptance became effective upon the
its dispatch or upon its receipt. The court decided that contract was
complete upon dispatch, not only upon receipt of the mailed acceptance,
because:
if that were so, no contract could ever be completed by the post. For if
the defendants were not bound by their offer when accepted by the
plaintiffs till the answer was received, then the plaintiffs ought not to be
bound till after they had received the notification that the defendants had
received their answer and assented to it. And so it might go on ad
infinitum. The defendants must be considered in law as making, during
every instant of the time their letter was travelling, the same identical
offer to the plaintiffs; and then the contract is completed by the
acceptance of it by the latter.1
25
At least a couple of observations about the holding of Adams v.
Lindsell bear mentioning. First, the court's concern that "no contract
could ever be completed by the post" if an actual receipt requirement
were imposed seems to be, at the very least, an exaggeration. Mutual
assent requires two acts-an offer and an acceptance. If the law
imposes an actual receipt requirement, the acceptance would be
complete-and the contract formed-upon its actual receipt by the
offeror. As a matter of contract formation, contract law does not
require, as the Adams court infers, a "third requirement" that the offeror
notify the offeree that the acceptance was received and "assented to."',
26
As a practical matter, this information undoubtedly would be helpful to
the offeree and would precede the parties' performance under the
contract, but it is clearly unnecessary to the technical formation of the
contract. And, in fact, since such post-acceptance notifications were not
technically necessary, the court's reasoning "and so it might go on ad
infinitum" is hyperbole, without which the court may well have been
inclined to adopt an actual receipt requirement for postal acceptances.
Second, under the doctrine of indirect revocation as it has since
developed, the adoption of the dispatch rule was unnecessary to the
court's holding. Recall that, prior to receiving the plaintiffs acceptance
letter, the defendants sold their wool to a third party.' 27  The court
apparently assumed that forming a contract only upon defendants'
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. Professor Williston made this same observation, noting that "[tlo modem thinking a
requirement that the acceptance should be received would not involve the conclusion that the offeror
must then accept the acceptance, and so go on ad infinitum." Williston, supra note 23, at 86 n.6.
127. Adams, 106 Eng. Rep. at 251.
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receipt of an acceptance would have otherwise effected a revocation of
the offer had the dispatch rule not been announced so as to result in a
conclusion that the contract had been formed prior to this third-party
sale. However, because the sale to the third-party was not
communicated to the plaintiffs, or otherwise brought to their
recognition, no revocation should have been found. 128  The resultant
effect is that, no revocation having occurred, the court could have still
found for the plaintiffs by holding that their acceptance was effective
upon defendants' receipt of their letter since the offer had not been
directly or indirectly revoked prior to this time.
Nevertheless, the rule in Adams v. Lindsell has become widely
followed. The Restatement drafters explain that the basis of the rule is
that "the offeree needs a dependable basis for his decision whether to
accept," 129 which mirrors the reasoning of the Adams court itself.
Above all, the primary bases typically articulated for the rule are the
need for certainty and stability.'
30
However, the rule is unquestionably inconsistent with the objective
theory of contracts. Recall that the modem formulation of objective
theory requires that "objective manifestations of intent of [a] party
should generally be viewed from the vantage point of a reasonable
person in the position of the other party."'13 1  In this case, the
manifestation of intent at issue is the acceptance. Thus, objective theory
requires that the manifestation of acceptance be viewed from the vantage
point of a reasonable person in the position of the offeror. Say that on
Day 1, A mails an offer to B, which B receives on Day 2. On Day 3, B
mails an acceptance, which A receives on Day 4. The mailbox rule
provides that a contract is formed on Day 3, the day of dispatch.
However, on Day 3, the fact of the acceptance is completely unknown to
A. A reasonable person in the position of A would not have any way to
make an informed conclusion about the acceptance. A would learn of
B's acceptance only after A actually received.the acceptance on Day 4.
Objective theory would find the acceptance effective upon A's receipt
when both A and B know of each other's manifestations, not on B's
128. Later, an offeree's discovery of information inconsistent with the offeror's desire to continue
to enter into the contract with the offeree clearly could constitute an indirect revocation, even absent any
direct communication of such lack of assent by the offeror. Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876).
However, even in that event, information had to come to the attention of the offeree to effect a
revocation. No such occurrence appears to have happened in Adams v. Lindsell, but rather the offeree in
that case seems to have been completely unaware of the sale to the third party.
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. a (1981).
130. See Watnick, supra note 120, at 179-80; MURRAY, supra note 24, § 47(A), at 162.
131. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 27 (citing Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir.
1946) (Frank, J., concurring)).
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dispatch when only B knows of A's manifestations.
The mailbox rule and its defiance of the objective theory of contracts
can be explained based on the historical accident that Adams v. Lindsell
was adjudicated at a time when the subjectivists happened to hold the
most sway over legal thinking:
At the present time courts of law ... have generally turned from this
[subjective] theory of contracts which was emphasized during the half
century or more following the year 1790, and have expressly or by
implication asserted that the words and acts of the parties are themselves
the basis of contractual liability, and not merely evidence of a mental
attitude required by the law.... Students seek for a reason why a letter of
acceptance is effective when mailed, while a letter revoking an offer is
ineffective until received. The actual reason for the distinction is that the
former rule was settled in the early part of the nineteenth century, and the
latter rule not until the second half of the century. Had the question been
squarely raised prior to 1850, there can be little doubt that mailing a letter
of revocation would have been held sufficient.13
2
Not only is the mailbox rule inconsistent with the objective theory of
contracts, but it stands out as an aberration to the otherwise nearly
invariable rule that manifestations of mutual assent must be
communicated and received to be effective.1 33  The initial offer by the
offeror must, of course, be received by the offeree to create the power of
acceptance. 134  After this, at least three, and perhaps four, possibilities
could occur next. The offeror may have second thoughts and decide to
withdraw the offer-a revocation.' 35 The offeree may desire to accept
132. Williston, supra note 23, at 87. Professor Williston further observed that "[ilt was rather on
account of the necessity of the situation than because logical requirements were thought to be satisfied
that it was held in Adams v. Lindsell, that mailing a letter of acceptance completed a contract proposed
by a letter sent through the post." Id. at 86 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the rule has been thought to
be the result of subjective thinking, probably because at the instant the offeree decided to accept and
mailed the letter, both parties were now "of the same mind" as to the intent to contract. See KEVIN M.
TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 182 (1990) ("[T]he
subjective standard was reinforced" by Adams v. Lindsell.), quoted in Perillo, supra note 4, at 439 n.77.
By contrast, Professor Perillo does not agree that there is anything inherently "subjectivist" in the Adams
decision. Perillo, supra note 4, at 439 ("Curiously, some scholars ... claim that Adams v. Lindsell...
was ... based on a subjective theory. One cannot gather from the report of the case whether a
subjective or objective theory nurtured the court's decision. The court seems to have had the pragmatic
goal of finding a rationale to uphold the formation of contracts by correspondence." (footnote omitted)).
133. See Eisler, supra note 118, at 558 ("The dispatch or mailbox rule departs from the parties'
expectations and from a more logical rule which would be in keeping with modem communications
technology. The mailbox rule also fails to parallel existing formation default rules." (footnote omitted)).
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 ("An offer is the manifestation of
willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent
to that bargain is invited and will conclude it."); see also LANGDELL, supra note 30, at 15
("[C]ommunication to the offeree is of the essence of every offer.").
135. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42.
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the offer-an acceptance.' 36  Or, the offeree may choose to reject the
offer outright, 137 or propose a counteroffer. 138 In all of these instances,
save only an initial acceptance by mail, the applicable manifestations of
intent are only effective upon the other's receipt of the manifestation.
1 39
Moreover, the mailbox rule is made inapplicable in the event of an
option contract, 14 and the offeror always has the power to specify in the
express terms of the offer that any acceptance must be actually received
in order to be effective. 14 1 The mailbox rule is thus aberrational. Most
parties would "expect that the default rule that governs acceptance
would be the same as the default rules that govern offer, revocation, and
rejection."'
142
The oddity of the mailbox rule and how it manipulates standard rules
of offer and acceptance are highlighted by the treatment of a vacillating
offeree. Say that A mails an offer to B on Day 1, and B receives the
offer on Day 2. On Day 3, B mails a rejection. But on Day 4, B, after a
change of mind, mails an acceptance. Applying the mailbox rule in this
scenario would be problematic because A may receive the rejection first,
rely on it, and deal with another party. To address this problem, section
40 of the Restatement makes the mailbox rule inapplicable in this
scenario and instead provides that the first communication received by
the offeror-the rejection or the acceptance-is effective.
143
136. See id.§ 63.
137. See id. § 38.
138. See id. § 39.
139. Compare id. § 42 ("An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when the offeree receives
from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into the proposed contract."), and id. § 40
("Rejection or counter-offer by mail or telegram does not terminate the power of acceptance until
received by the offeror ...."), with id. § 63(a) ("Unless the offer provides otherwise, ... an acceptance
made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes the manifestation of
mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches
the offeror ....").
140. Id. § 63(b).
141. See Comeill A. Stephens, Escape from the Battle of the Forms: Keep it Simple, Stupid, II
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 233, 237 (2007) ("At common law, the offeror was deemed to be the master of
his offer. That is, the offeror was master of the terms of the contract created by acceptance of the offer.
As such, the offeree could accept the offer only by exactly complying with the terms of the offer."
(footnote omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 29, 58)); PERILLO, supra note 3,
§2.23(a), at 112 ("The offeror, it must be remembered, is master of the offer and has power to negate the
mailbox rule. This can be done by framing the offer so as to require actual receipt of an acceptance as a
precondition to the formation of the contract. However, such a requirement must be clearly expressed."
(footnote omitted) (citing Union Interchange, Inc. v. Sierota, 355 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1960); Holland v.
Riverside Park Estates, Inc., 104 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. 1958); Lewis v. Browning, 130 Mass. 173 (1880); W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Gardner, 278 S.W. 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:40;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. b)).
142. Eisler, supra note 118, at 569.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 40 ("Rejection or counter-offer by mail or
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Accordingly, the offeree who deposited a rejection in the mail is advised
to send subsequent acceptance by faster means, such as overnight
delivery, fax, or e-mail.
Or, even more problematic, consider the scenario where, instead of
rejecting first, B mails an acceptance to A on Day 3 and then, on Day 4
and after a change of mind, sends a rejection by expedited delivery so
that it is received prior to the acceptance. Then B asserts a contract was
formed in the first place by the mailbox rule. A strict application of the
mailbox rule would provide that a contract formed immediately upon
dispatch of the acceptance on Day 3. A's expectations, of course, would
depend on which communication arrived first, the acceptance or the
rejection. Assuming the rejection arrived first, A's expectations (no
contract) would be at odds with the legal conclusion formed by
operation of the mailbox rule (contract). There is authority for the
proposition that, in this instance, B will be estopped from enforcing the
contract formed by the mailbox rule based on A's reliance on the prior-
arriving rejection. 
144
As is readily apparent, the mailbox rule tortures other contract
doctrines to conform to its aberrational nature. Furthermore, the rule is
based on questionable, or at least antiquated, notions of the problems
allegedly inherent in communicating through the mails or otherwise.
Like the dying offer rule, the mailbox rule is arbitrary and outmoded.
B. The Solution: Discard the Rule in Favor ofAnalyzing Objective
Appearance of Intent
Solving the problem of the mailbox rule is easy: eliminate it. The
mailbox rule is inconsistent with the objective theory of contracts, which
vindicates freedom of contract and personal autonomy concerns. 145 It is
a historical accident of the temporary ascendancy of the subjective
theory of contracts. 146 It was based on questionable assumptions by the
court. 14 7 It is an aberration from the normal rule of contract law that
telegram does not terminate the power of acceptance until received by the offeror, but limits the power
so that a letter or telegram of acceptance started after the sending of an otherwise effective rejection or
counter-offer is only a counter-offer unless the acceptance is received by the offeror before he receives
the rejection or counter-offer.").
144. E. Frederics, Inc. v. Felton Beauty Supply Co., 198 S.E. 324 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938), overruled
on other grounds by Willis v. Hill, 159 S.E.2d 145 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967), rev'd, 161 S.E.2d 281 (Ga.
1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. c, cited in PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.23(a),
at 113.
145. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
146. Williston, supra note 23, at 87.
147. See Adams v. Lindsell, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818) (decision assumed: (1) no contract
could ever be completed by mail without mailbox rule, and (2) under the facts of the case the sale of the
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communications intended to create, or destroy, contractual intent must
be actually received to be effective. 148  The rule could easily be
eliminated, by legislation if necessary, and the objective theory of
contracts could be substituted in its place.
Consider again the example where A mails an offer to B on Day 1,
and B receives the offer on Day 2. On Day 3, B mails an acceptance,
which A receives on Day 4. Under the mailbox rule, the contract would
be created on Day 3 even though A has no knowledge that a contract has
been created at that point. And this is true, even if B's acceptance never
reaches A (unless due to B's misaddressing of the letter). 149 That is, the
mailbox rule places the risk of nondelivery on the offeror, even though
the offeree places the acceptance letter in the mail. But the mailbox
rule's risk allocation is hardly the only sensible outcome, as noted over a
century ago by Dean Langdell:
It has been claimed that the purposes of substantial justice, and the
interests of contracting parties as understood by themselves, will be best
served by holding that the contract is complete the moment the letter of
acceptance is mailed; and cases have been put to show that the contrary
view would produce not only unjust but absurd results. The true answer
to this argument is, that it is irrelevant; but, assuming it to be relevant, it
may be turned against those who use it without losing any of its strength.
The only cases of real hardship are where there is a miscarriage of the
letter of acceptance, and in those cases a hardship to one of the parties is
inevitable. Adopting one view, the hardship consists in making one liable
on a contract which he is ignorant of having made; adopting the other
view, it consists in depriving one of the benefit of a contract which he
supposes he has made. Between these two evils the choice would seem to
be clear: the former is positive, the latter merely negative; the former
imposes a liability to which no limit can be placed, the latter leaves
everything in statu quo. As to making provision for the contingency of
the miscarriage of a letter, this is easy for the person who sends it, while it
is practically impossible for the person to whom it is sent.
150
True, the offeror, in the original offer, could specify that acceptance
must be received to be effective, and in that sense, the offeror has
wool to a third party would have been sufficient to constitute a revocation absent formation of the
contract via the mailbox rule); see also supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 134-144 and accompanying text.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63(a); Eisler, supra note 118, at 563 (citing
United Leasing, Inc. v. Commonwealth Land Title Agency of Tucson, Inc., 656 P.2d 1246, 1250 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1982); 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 118, § 3.22). The benefit of this rule depends, however, on
the acceptance being dispatched properly, such as to the correct addressee and with the proper address.
See PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.23(a), at 110 ("The [mailbox rule] prevails generally throughout the U.S.,
with the qualification that the acceptance must be dispatched in a proper manner." (footnote omitted)).
150. LANGDELL, supra note 30, at 20-21 (footnotes omitted).
2008] THE OBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 1147
control of the outcome. 151 However, often an offeror will not think to do
this, and in those instances, the ability to control the means of
acceptance is left with the offeree. Dean Langdell was correct that,
between the offeror and the offeree, the offeree is in the best position to
protect itself by the means of acceptance. And further, using an actual
receipt rule, the worst case scenario for a miscarried acceptance is
simply that no contract is formed. 52  On the other hand, the mailbox
rule's worst case scenario is that a contract is formed despite one of the
parties having no knowledge of it.
153
And the offeree, in this present era, has a multitude of means by
which to communicate an acceptance in an expeditious manner: fax,
telephone, cellular phone, text message, e-mail, and text message. 54
Eliminating the mailbox rule will shift the advantage from the offeree to
the offeror, but this makes good sense:'
55
Because substantially instantaneous methods of communication are now
so inexpensive and common, the burden should be placed on the offeree
if he refuses to take advantage of these modes of communication. If an
offeree refuses to use [these] . .. substantially instantaneous methods of
communication, the offeree's convenience should not be protected.1
56
The elimination of the mailbox rule should also lead to greater
economic efficiency in contracting. Economists state that open
communication is necessary for efficient contracting. 157  Open
communication only is achieved when both parties have actually
received all communications from the other party. The mailbox rule
fails to achieve this, but an actual receipt rule serves these economic
exchange purposes much better.
Finally, eliminating the mailbox rule and requiring actual receipt of
an acceptance for it to be effective would protect the freedom of contract
and autonomy of the parties. To fully preserve this autonomy, courts
should not enforce a contract against an offeror unless a reasonable
151. See Stephens, supra note 141, at 327 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 29,
58); PERILLO, supra note 3, §2.23(a), at 112 (citing Union Interchange, Inc. v. Sierota, 355 P.2d 1089
(Colo. 1960); Holland v. Riverside Park Estates, Inc., 104 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. 1958); Lewis v. Browning,
130 Mass. 173 (1880); W. Union Tel. Co. v. Gardner, 278 S.W. 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); 1
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:40; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 cmt. b)).
152. LANGDELL, supra note 30, at 21.
153. Id.
154. The offeree can still communicate an acceptance to the offeror face-to-face! Though, this is
admittedly becoming less common in our society. See JOHN L. LOCKE, WHY WE DON'T TALK TO EACH
OTHER ANYMORE: THE DE-VOICING OF SOCIETY (1999).
155. Eisler, supra note 118, at 568.
156. Id. at 568-69 (footnote omitted).
157. Id. at 571 (citing R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988)).
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person in the offeror's position would believe a contract was formed.
This cannot happen until the offeror actually receives the acceptance.
After making an offer, but before acceptance, the offeror has the right to
revoke the offer.158  The mailbox rule arbitrarily cuts the offeror's
revocation right short in favor of an unbargained-for right of the offeree
to immediately bind the offeror on dispatch of an acceptance. "The
offeree should not receive this unexpected and unbargained-for
protection. If the offeree wants the protection of an irrevocable offer,
the offeree should be required to obtain an option from the offeror."'
159
Otherwise, the autonomy of both parties should be protected, and each
should only be able to bind the other by effective communication that is
received by the other party before the communication forms or rejects a
contract. This furthers contract law's quintessential principles of
freedom of contract and personal autonomy.
V. CONSENT TO STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS
A. The Origin of Form Contracts and Generally Applicable Rules
Standard form contracts are ubiquitous. As David Slawson remarked
in 1971:
S[tandard] form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine
percent of all the contracts now made. Most persons have difficulty
remembering the last time they contracted other than by standard form;
except for casual oral agreements, they probably never have. But if they
are active, they contract by standard form several times a day. Parking lot
and theater tickets, package receipts, department store charge slips, and
gas station credit card purchase slips are all standard form contracts.
160
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42 (1981) ("An offeree's power of acceptance is
terminated when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into
the proposed contract.").
159. Eisler, supra note 118, at 566-67. As Professor Eisler points out, actually the offeree may
seek or obtain the protection of irrevocability in ways other than simply obtaining an expressly
bargained-for option, such as a signed writing, a "firm offer" under the UCC, or reliance on an offer.
See id. (citing N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1109 (McKinney 1989); U.C.C. § 2-205 (1990);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 87(2), 90; Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal.
1958)).
160. W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power,
84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). One of the earliest academic descriptions of the rising phenomenon
of standard form contracts observed:
No longer do individuals bargain for this or that provision in the contract .... The
control of the wording of those contracts has passed into the hands of the concern, and
the drafting into the hands of its legal advisor .... In the trades affected it is henceforth
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The use of standard form contracts has only increased since the time of
Slawson's observations.' 6
The impact of form contracting is difficult to overestimate. Henry
Maine observed in 1861 that "the movement of the progressive societies
has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract."' 62  Maine's
observation recognized the move away from stratification based on fixed
classes in favor of freedom of contract. However, scholars soon began
wondering if the standard form contract was threatening to
philosophically reverse that trend. 1
63
Professor Rakoff identified seven quintessential attributes of a
standard form contract. First, it consists of a printed form containing
several terms in the form of a contract. Second, the contract is drafted
by one of the contracting parties to the agreement, typically a merchant.
Third, the merchant engages in a volume of the same types of
transactions on a regular basis. Fourth, the merchant imposes the form
on the consumer on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. Fifth, the consumer
will usually sign the contract after minimal, if any, negotiation. Sixth,
the consumer does not similarly engage in a volume of the type of
transaction at issue. Seventh, the principle consumer obligation is
usually to pay money.
164
The reasons that merchants desire to use standard form contracts are
fairly clear. Form contracts are widely used because they are fully
futile for an individual to attempt any modification, and incorrect for the economist and
lawyer to classify or judge such arrangements as standing on an equal footing with
individual agreements.
Meyerson, supra note 37, at 1264 (alterations in original) (quoting OTTO PRAUSNITZ, THE
STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW 18 (1937),
reviewed by Karl Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939)).
161. Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1203 (2003).
162. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 170 (Thoemmes Press 1996) (1861) (emphasis
omitted).
163. See generally Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917);
Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 640-41 (1943) ("Standard contracts in particular could thus become effective instruments in
the hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order
of their own making upon a vast host of vassals. This spectacle is all the more fascinating since not
more than a hundred years ago contract ideology had been successfully used to break down the last
vestiges of a patriarchal and benevolent feudal order in the field of master and servant .... Thus the
return back from contract to status which we experience today was greatly facilitated by the fact that the
belief in freedom of contract has remained one of the firmest axioms in the whole fabric of the social
philosophy of our culture." (footnote omitted) (citing Note, "Mutuality" in Exclusive Sales Agency
Agreements, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 830 (1931))).
164. Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1177 (1983).
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customizable to the transaction and parties involved. 165  Merchants use
form contracts to insert boilerplate terms that reduce or eliminate a
variety of risks.' 6 6 By reducing risks, merchants can offer lower prices
for their goods and services, and can increase their profits.' 67  The
prevalence of their use is itself indicative of the indispensable nature of
form contracts to commercial activity.
168
Consumers have a different perspective on standard form contracts.
From their perspective, form contracts (1) are not usually subject to
negotiation, (2) contain terms governing unlikely contingencies, (3) are
only scrutinized for certain key terms, and (4) are routinely disregarded
by consumers in favor of simply taking into account the reputation of the
enterprise.169 "The consumer's experience of modem commercial life is
one not of freedom in the full sense posited by traditional contract law,
but rather one of submission to organizational domination, leavened by
the ability to choose the organization by which he will be dominated."
' 170
Above all, consumers simply do not read standard form contracts.171
The system assumes, however unrealistically, that the consumer has read
and understood the form and consents to every term. On this basis, the
165. Kessler, supra note 163, at 631.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 632.
168. Slawson, supra note 160, at 530.
169. Rakoff, supra note 164, at 1225-28. As Hillman and Rachlinski point out:
Consumers also have good reason to believe that the standard terms are not
something to worry about. Consumers recognize that boilerplate language is usually a
matter of customary practice within an industry, rather than an attempt by a single
business to exploit them. .... Consumers may sign standard-form contracts without
reading them carefully because they believe that most businesses are not willing to risk
the cost to their reputation of using terms to exploit consumers.
Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 446-47 (2002) (footnotes omitted) (citing John J.A. Burke, Contracts as a
Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 286-90 (2000); Daniel T. Ostas,
Postmodern Economic Analysis of Law: Extending the Pragmatic Visions of Richard A. Posner, 36 AM.
Bus. L.J. 193, 229 (1998); Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations
Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1482 (1989)).
170. Rakoff, supra note 164, at 1229.
171. See id. at 1179 (citing P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 731
(1979); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370-71 & n.338
(1960); lAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS 445 (2d ed. 1978); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths
About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 13
(1981); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law
Tradition, 31 U. Pir. L. REV. 349, 349 (1970); Karl N. Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon
Economics, 15 AM. ECON. REV. 665, 673 (1925); Arnold Louis Rotkin, Standard Forms: Legal
Documents in Search of an Appropriate Body of Law, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 603; Slawson, supra note
160, at 531; William C. Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions,
1973 Wis. L. REV. 400, 425-26).
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law of contracts has heretofore subsumed form contracts within its
structure.
The traditional contracting process and the rules developed to govern
such process are based on the consensual and knowing incurrence of
promissory obligations. And so a dissonance exists between that
paradigmatic model and the reality of standard form contracting.'72
Professor Meyerson has observed that "[s]tandard form contracts have
been in use for over two centuries, and the question of the proper
construction of these contracts has haunted contract law ever since."
173
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, the law has attempted to handle standard
form contracts differently than individually negotiated agreements.
174
Karl Llewellyn set forth an early theory of consumer assent to
standard-form contracts:
Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can
recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all.
What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, and but one thing more. That
one thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not
unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do
not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The
fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under the
reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the
dominant and only real expression of agreement, but much of it
commonly belongs in.
175
The "blanket assent" described by Llewellyn can theoretically be
troublesome because it vests tremendous trust in the merchant.
However, Llewellyn's theory requires that the merchant not abuse this
trust by inserting "unreasonable" or "indecent" terms into the form
contract. 176 Llewellyn observed that most unread terms are reasonable
and unobjectionable. He thus proposed a doctrine that differentiated
these clauses from the ones of "oppression or outrage."'1 77 The modern
172. Rakoff, supra note 164, at 1180.
173. Meyerson, supra note 37, at 1263. Meyerson observes that the first use of standard form
contracts was in the marine insurance industry. Id. at 1263-64 (citing PRAUSNITZ, supra note 160, at 11,
reviewed by Llewellyn, supra note 160).
174. Rakoff, supra note 164, at 1174. Rakoff illustrated this by point by alluding to the then
newly-drafted section 211 of the Restatement, as well as new sections in Corbin's treatise. Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981); 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§§ 559A-5591 (C. Kaufman Supp. 1982)).
175. LLEWELLYN, supra note 17 1, at 370.
176. Id.; see also Rakoff, supra note 164, at 1200 & n.98 (observing that comment b states that
the consumer "trust[s] to the good faith of the party using the forin" (alteration in original) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b)).
177. LLEWELLYN, supra note 171, at 366 ("[A]mong those terms which plainly are in fact
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heir to Llewellyn's conceptualization is the unconscionability doctrine
by which courts invalidate contracts if they find them unconscionable. 1
78
From the origins of Llewellyn's theory to the development of
principles governing standard form contracts in the ensuing decades,
several doctrines have been developed to govern their creation and use.
Professor Rakoff described the following aspects of contract law's
treatment of form contracts:
(1) The adherent's signature on a document clearly contractual in
nature, which he had an opportunity to read, will be taken to signify his
assent and thus will provide the basis for enforcing the contract.
(2) It is legally irrelevant whether the adherent actually read the
contents of the document, or understood them, or subjectively assented to
them.
(3) The adherent's assent covers all the terms of the document, and
not just the custom-tailored ones or the ones that have been discussed.
(4) Exceptions to the foregoing principles are narrow. In particular,
failure of the drafting party to point out or explain the form terms does
not constitute an excuse. Instead, in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances, the adherent can establish an excuse only by showing
affirmative participation by the drafting party in causing
misunderstanding.
B. Standard Form Contract Rules and Objective Theory
Rakoff s four theories regarding form contracts are all related, in
some manner or other, to the objective theory of contracts. 180  The
consumer need not subjectively assent to every term in the form.
Instead, the consumer's apparent, external assent to the standard form as
a whole provides an objectively reasonable appearance of contractual
consent to a reasonable person in the position of the merchant.18' This is
bound to the fact that consumers rarely read form contracts, though the
law imposes on them a duty to do so (or binds them to the terms in any
event). 182 As Robert Braucher once observed regarding consumer assent
assented to only one time in a thousand[,] there are still many which are sound particularizations of the
deal to the business, very useful and wholly within reason; and those ought to be sustained and applied.
A workable guide for courts must offer some wherewithal to sort such out from the clauses of
oppression or outrage ...."), cited in Rakoff, supra note 164, at 1202.
178. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208.
179. Rakoff, supra note 164, at 1185.
180. Id. at 1185-86.
181. Id. at 1186.
182. 7 PERILLO, supra note 10, § 29.8, at 402-03 ("[O]ne having the capacity to understand a
written document who reads it, or, without reading it or having it read to him, signs it, is bound by his
signature." (quoting Rossi v. Douglas, 100 A.2d 3, 7 (Md. 1953))); see also Rakoff, supra note 164, at
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to form contracts, "We all know that if you have a page of print, whether
it's large or small, which nobody is really expected to read, and you
expect to agree to it, and you sort of put your head in the lion's mouth
and hope it will be a friendly lion."'
' 83
But in another sense, assent to standard form contracts is problematic
from the standpoint of the objective theory of contracts. The duty to
read is quite one sided. This doctrine has placed the entire burden on the
consumer, with only the unconscionability doctrine as a failsafe. The
duty to read rule essentially allows merchants to insert one-sided terms
at will, and consumers are simply bound if they sign. Professor Rakoff
observed that "[t]his 'duty' can just as well be viewed as a refusal to
impose any duty on the drafting party to ascertain whether form terms
are known and understood."
184
But the objective theory of contracts should take into account the
knowledge of merchants and their perspectives of the consumer's assent
to their forms. Merchants know that consumers do not read their forms.
Merchants know, or in many cases they reasonably should know, that a
consumer may object to one or more terms in the contract (such as a
severe forum selection clause, a damages limitation, or an arbitration
clause). Modem objective theory provides that "objective
manifestations of intent of [a] party should generally be viewed from the
vantage point of a reasonable person in the position of the other
party."' 185 What then should the conclusion of objective theory be here?
The consumer's manifestation of assent (the consumer's signature on the
form) should be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable person in
the position of the merchant. While a neutral, third-party observer might
view the consumer's signature as final and definitive, the merchant (in
my hypothetical) knew, or should have known, that the consumer would
not agree to the objectionable clause. And this is problematic for
traditional contractual assent as to that clause, but the law has basically
overlooked this inconsistency with objective theory, probably for
reasons of pragmatism and commercial reality.
Some commentators have acknowledged this inherent problem with
standard form contracts and the duty to read rule. Karl Llewellyn
recognized that "where bargaining is absent in fact, the conditions and
clauses to be read into a bargain are not those which happen to be
printed on the unread paper, but are those which a sane man might
1185-86.
183. 47 A.L.I. PROC. 525 (1970).
184. Rakoff, supra note 164, at 1187.
185. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 27 (citing Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir.
1946) (Frank, J., concurring)).
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reasonably expect to find on that paper. ' 86 More modem commentatorshave acknowledged the problem as well:
[C]onfusion continues to reign mostly because those seeking answers
have searched too hard. The conceptual difficulties stem from one
fundamental error: the common law presumption, often conclusive, that
consumers who sign form contracts are aware of, understand, and assent
to the unread, unexpected and uncontemplated terms in the form
contracts. This presumption of assent conflicts with the objective theory
of contracts. Because the drafters of these contracts know not only that
their forms will not be read, but also that it is reasonable for consumers to
sign them unstudied, a reasonable drafter should have no illusion that
there has been true assent to these terms....
In short, courts correctly applying the objective theory to consumer
form contracts will not assume automatically that there is objective
agreement to all terms merely because they have been printed and a
document has been signed. Rather, courts will try to determine how a
reasonable drafter should have understood the consumer's agreement. 1
87
Unlike, possibly, the dying offer rule and the mailbox rule, standard
form contracts are undoubtedly here to stay. However, the doctrines
pertaining to these contracts, such as the duty to read rule, create severe
dissonance between form contracts and the objective theory as to terms
that the merchant knows would be objectionable to the consumer. Such
doctrines, applied rigidly and without consideration of the merchant's
superior knowledge of the consumer's preferences, are antithetical to the
idea of full, knowing, and voluntary consent to contractual obligations.
The extent to which merchants exploit the duty to read rule by inserting
protective terms that they know the consumer will not read, even though
the merchants also know, or should know, that the consumer would not
agree to the term if consumer was made aware of it, is particularly
objectionable. Standard form contract doctrines should therefore be
reformed to conform to the objective theory of contracts as to these
terms and thereby to protect the freedom of contract and personal
autonomy of consumers entering into such contracts.
186. Meyerson, supra note 37, at 1277 (quoting Llewellyn, supra note 160, at 704). Meyerson
observed that Llewellyn's position bore a great deal of similarity to the doctrine of reasonable
expectations in insurance law. ld. See generally Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance
with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961 (1970) (describing the doctrine of reasonable
expectations); Kessler, supra note 163, at 637 (arguing that courts should ascertain the consumer's
reasonable expectations in assenting to the form contract, and whether the business entity "disappointed
reasonable expectations based on the typical life situation").
187. Meyerson, supra note 37, at 1265 (emphasis added).
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C. The Solution: Conform the Rules to Objective Theory
The solution is to incorporate objective theory explicitly into standard
form contract disputes. Llewellyn's paradigm of consent to both
dickered terms and to unread boilerplate should remain the starting point
for analysis of assent to form contracts. 188 The duty to read rule springs
from this philosophical vantage point, and it should also remain as a
starting point. Again, most boilerplate terms will be unexceptional and
unobjectionable, even if the consumer never has actual notice of them
because the form remains unread. This approach squares with objective
theory as an initial matter, because the merchant can take the consumer's
outward manifestation of assent to the form (by signing it) as evidence
that he has the requisite intent to be bound.
But this starting point should give way when there are, embedded in
the form, one or more terms that the merchant knows (1) have gone
unread by the consumer and (2) are, or may be, objectionable to the
consumer. That is to say, the analysis under objective theory should
take into account any superior knowledge that the merchant has over the
hypothetical reasonable person otherwise observing the consumer's
assent to the form. Contract law governing form contracts has, to date,
simply glossed over this scenario, except to give consumers the possible
escape hatch of the unconscionability doctrine. 189 But in the event the
merchant knows an unread term in the form would be objectionable to a
consumer if known, the consumer's assent to that term cannot withstand
scrutiny under the objective theory of contracts. Specifically, a
reasonable person in the position of a merchant would know that the
consumer's assent to that term is defective. Stated another way,
objective theory would not countenance a merchant exploiting a
consumer's not reading a form by leavening the form with terms the
merchant knows the consumer would likely not agree to.
Conveniently, such a rule has already been in place for some time,
though to date it has not been widely used or adopted. That rule is
section 211 of the Restatement, specifically subsection (3).190 Section
211 provides as follows:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement
188. LLEWELLYN, supra note 171, at 370.
189. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
190. 1 have previously argued that subsection 211(3) should be adopted, in a wider analysis of all
the problems inherent with standard form contracts. Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of
Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH.
L. REV. 227 (2007). Here, I am simply focusing on the objective theory concerns addressed by
subsection 211(3).
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signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe
that like writings are regularly used to embody terms of agreements of the
same type, he adopts the writing as an integrated agreement with respect
to the terms included in the writing....
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting
such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a
particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.
19 1
Subsection (1) of section 211 essentially codifies the "duty to read"
paradigm that has been the hallmark of standard form contract
jurisprudence to date.192 However, subsection (3) provides the means to
incorporate objective theory into a standard form contract analysis. It
provides a means of invalidating the consumer's assent to a term, if the
"other party" (which will invariably be the merchant) has reason to
believe that the consumer would not agree to the contract if the
consumer had read, and thereby known of, the objectionable term.'
93
This subsection "is designed to deter merchants from exploiting the
reality that consumers do not read standard form contracts, and thus
prevents consumers from being 'bound to unknown terms which are
beyond the range of reasonable expectation.""
'194
Section 211(3) has not been widely adopted by courts or legislatures,
and the reasons are unclear. Some commentators and courts apparently
believe that existing doctrines, including mainly the unconscionability
doctrine, sufficiently address the concerns presented by consumer
agreement to unfair terms in standard form contracts.' 95 At least one
commentator condemned the misapplication of the rule by one
jurisdiction that has adopted it. 196 But "[m]isapplication of legal rules
by activist judges is always a risk, however, and [this commentator's]
condemnation of the rule is therefore not as severe as it might at first
appear."1
97
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (emphasis added).
192. See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 169, at 458.
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3).
194. Barnes, supra note 190, at 249 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt.
f).
195. See id. at 249-51 (citing James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH.
U. L.Q. 315 (1997); Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1805 (2000)).
196. See White, supra note 195, at 346-47.
197. David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241,
291 n.223.
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Applying section 211(3), or some close analog to it, and thereby
incorporating the objective theory of contracts into any analysis of
standard form contract disputes, would serve the underlying interests of
freedom of contract and personal autonomy. Principles of fairness and
good faith dictate that merchants should not be able to unfairly exploit
the reality that consumers do not read form contracts. A merchant
should not be able to take advantage of this scenario by surreptitiously
placing terms in the contract form, which the merchant knows would be
objectionable to the consumer if it were only brought to the consumer's
attention in a meaningful way. This practice, countenanced for the
better part of a century by traditional contract law and arguments of
business necessity, is completely antithetical to the paradigm of
knowing, mutual, and voluntary assent to contract terms. While
business practices perhaps necessitate the use of standard forms, contract
law diverged from a cognitively sensible path when it ignored
merchants' practice of willfully flouting the ideal of mutual consent in
this manner.' 98  Thus, a reformation of standard form contract
doctrine-to realign with objective theory-is in order. Adoption and
use of section 211(3) of the Restatement would go a long way toward
implementation of this goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The objective theory of contracts is the dominant philosophy in
contract law for determining mutual assent to an enforceable agreement.
The reasons are clear. It is a pragmatic rule, basing the determination of
mutual assent on tangible, verifiable external evidence, rather than
relying on problematic proof of subjective intent. It enforces the
reliance and expectation interests of the parties. And perhaps most
importantly, it vindicates the freedom of contract and personal autonomy
of all parties in the contracting process.
198. There is one thing I wish to mention here, and that is how the adoption of this approach
might affect the doctrine of unconscionability. A fair objection to my proposal might well be that the
unconscionability doctrine could already "save" consumers from the types of terms which might
otherwise fail objective theory. Though this is beyond the scope of the point at hand-Restatement
section 211(3) sounds in objective theory and should therefore be utilized-I should mention that, in the
first place, unconscionability has not been the most reliable protection for consumers in the actual
adjudication of contract disputes. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 74, at 1096-97. Nevertheless, in
any event, I am proposing a reformulation of the paradigm of consumer assent to standard form
contracts, and the fact that existing unconscionability doctrine may be able to reach some of these cases
is not, to my mind, a compelling reason not to implement objective theory in form contract disputes.
However, it may be that unconscionability still has a role to play, especially in those instances where a
consumer knowingly agreed to some egregious term. Objective theory would not help such a consumer,
but unconscionability would still be a perfect vehicle to protect the consumer if a court so warranted.
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Though the objective theory of contracts is now dominant, some
nagging, historical inconsistencies remain. In particular, three doctrines
violate the objective theory's maxim that "objective manifestations of
intent of [a] party should generally be viewed from the vantage point of
a reasonable person in the position of the other party."' 99 The dying
offer rule terminates the offer on the death of the offeror, even when the
offeree is completely unaware of this fact or might reasonably assume
that the offeror wanted the offer to survive his death. The mailbox rule
provides that, in some instances, a contract is formed immediately upon
the offeree's dispatch of the acceptance, even though the offeror is
unaware of the dispatch, and even though the acceptance may never
actually reach the offeror. And, courts currently countenance most
consumer assent to standard form contracts, even where a person in the
position of the merchant would know that the consumer does not (or
would not) agree to one or more terms contained in the form.
These three doctrines all have their historical rationales and
justifications. However, the force of those rationales has dissipated, if
they ever held substantial currency. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once
stated,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past.
200
The rationales behind the three doctrines discussed herein are not as
strong as has been historically supposed, and contract law would be
better served by a recasting the doctrines in the image of the objective
theory of contracts. As one early scholar put it, "There is a need for a
total abandonment of the old terminology and for a consistent
restatement of the law of contracts on the basis of the analysis now
generally accepted and in its terminology. ' 20 1 This is the case with
objective theory. Eliminating or changing the doctrines discussed in this
Article would align them with objective theory, serve the greater good of
reforming contract law, and vindicate the principles of freedom of
contract and personal autonomy.
199. PERILLO, supra note 3, § 2.2, at 27 (citing Ricketts v. Pa. R.R., 153 F.2d 757, 760-61 (2d Cir.
1946) (Frank, J., concurring)).
200. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
201. Oliphant, supra note 24, at 201.
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